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Missile Defense

Russian military leaders have expressed concern about US plans for a national missile defense system. Will defense technology be limited by possibilities for a strategic imbalance? Is this just SDI all over again?

artemis130 - 11:26pm May 4, 2001 EST (#3320 of 3326)
caveat venditor

At least you are presenting an argument and reasoning that's honest and has some merit artemis.

Why, thank you Gisterme.

1. We don't need to break the treaty. Negotiation is going on with the Russians now about that.

Fine. I'm not against modifications that keep them in the loop, just unilateral follies. The Russians, as some of us already know - can be your best friends or your worst enemies.

2. Russia has had MIRV'd ICBMs for years. That's public knowledge.

True, but they've the capacity to add 50-100% to the payloads, which is now prohibited.

The cold war is over. The USSR no longer exists. Whatever our differences may be, Russia and the US are not enemies any longer.

Interesting.

I remember a few threats going Yeltsin's way that elicited a harsh reminder that they're still a nuclear power from him.

I remember a US promise in '91 that if the Warsaw Pact were peacefully dismantled, that no expansion of NATO would be forthcoming.

I remember a little place called Rambouillet, where a certain Secretary of State had her former-terrorist turned instant-democrat turned newborn-terrorist boytoy in tow for a round of less-than-serious negotiations.

I remember a little country called FRY whose civilian infrastructure was nicely FRIED by a "purely defensive" organization called NATO, at the US's behest.

I remember a few little Washington tea-parties and receptions held for a number of "special envoys from Ichkeria".

Yes indeed - you're at least half right. As far as Russia's concerned, the cold war's over. Let's see if we can meet them half-way. Right now, I have my doubts.

possumdag - 02:35am May 5, 2001 EST (#3321 of 3326)
Possumdag@excite.com

American theorists have assumed that because a Soviet hydrogen bomb would propagate the same nuclear effects over New York as a similar American bomb would over Leningrad, then Soviet doctrine of nuclear war must be governed by the same logic as American. That this assumption is not always true has perhaps been the most significant finding of the Western debate over Soviet strategic doctrine. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1982/mar-apr/millett.html

possumdag - 02:49am May 5, 2001 EST (#3322 of 3326)
Possumdag@excite.com

+ • Probably the most effective strategy to prevent the potentially disastrous consequences of a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union is to strike first when war seems imminent. Soviet leaders have repeatedly insisted that the Soviet Union will not be the first to launch an attack. Yet they will have a compelling incentive to initiate a nuclear attack on the West if they perceive that the West is on the verge of attacking the Soviet Union. In this situation, who attacks first and who commits aggression become largely semantic. In Soviet logic, such a nuclear attack would be preemptive in the sense of active defense rather than offensive aggression. Soviet ideology dictates that only the imperialists can commit aggression because of their odious economic and political system. Soviet open military literature does not directly discuss the logic of the Soviet preemptive attack, yet it often implies such, particularly in the historical analyses of World War II.

possumdag - 03:00am May 5, 2001 EST (#3323 of 3326)
Possumdag@excite.com

It seems that even when dealing with MD the strategy is 'made on the run' (above).

This Exciting stuff ... yawn ... continues:

However, the Soviet ICBMs are terribly vulnerable to elimination from American missiles if the U.S. attacks first and catches many if not all Soviet ICBMs still in their silos. Therefore, the Soviets cannot afford to wait out an American first-strike if the Soviets think they must wage nuclear war against the United States and come out comparatively better. The strategic incentive for the Soviets lays with the preemptive strike, with all the advantages of preparation and surprise, not with the second-strike strategy of mutual assured destruction deterrence.

possumdag - 04:28am May 5, 2001 EST (#3324 of 3326)
Possumdag@excite.com

The problem with strikes is
'who strikes?'

Isn't it dangerous to strike
On Presidents they are deemed unworthy to make the decision
Decisions take a long time to make
By the time the decision is made it will be too late
The auto-strike was manually over-ridden
Pressing this button will destroy 50million people - instantly ...
sounds like an instruction for instant pudding .. take 50 Million people put them in a mixing bowl ...
The dust will settle on lungs turning them cancerous
You are instructed to stand an watch the flash and cloud ... face the music!
but you'll never see the player again
Nuclear brightness has 'taken' your sight
Wear special rubber gloves and boots
Destroy your clothing
It is contaminated
Eat and you will tick with
every passing 'counter
Watch out for nuclear winter --
you can't dress for it
The American President is NOT
permitted to send e-mails
Turn those formal lawns
into a sports pitch
What's your policy on first strikes ...
Hold the bat shoulder high
Then hit the ball hard
And RUN

(2 following messages)

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