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Russian military leaders have expressed concern about US plans
for a national missile defense system. Will defense technology be
limited by possibilities for a strategic imbalance? Is this just SDI
all over again?
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wrcooper
- 04:33pm May 3, 2001 EST (#3171
of 3174) The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable
mystery. Doubt [and] uncertainty...appear the only result of our
most accurate scrutiny....But such is the frailty of human reason.
--David Hume
But of course, Cold War deterrence was never premised on enemy
leaders sharing our values, liking us, or even caring whether their
own people died. As I've noted before in this space, deterrence
assumes only that enemy leaders don't want to die themselves. If
Bush thinks Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-il don't care about their
own survival he should say so, but so far the evidence suggests
pretty strongly that these guys are survivors. Of particular
relevance: During the Persian Gulf War, after Secretary of State
James Baker made a veiled threat to respond with nuclear force to
the use of chemical weapons, Hussein kept his ample supply of
chemical weapons sheathed.
Nuclear blackmail : In light of this Persian Gulf episode, it's
ironic that Bush yesterday cited the war with Iraq as an argument
for missile defense : The alliance that rolled back Iraqi aggression
"would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able
to blackmail with nuclear weapons."
Of course, it's possible that, even though Hussein would have
been bluffing, the bluff would have worked. If enough European and
American citizens decided there was at least a tiny chance he'd
deliver on his threat, their fear might have proved politically
paralyzing. But if a tiny chance of successful nuclear attack is
paralyzing, then missile defense isn't going to help. After all, not
even supporters of missile defense think it will be 100-percent
effective, and most observers think its success rate would be much
lower. And, as an extremely perceptive critic of missile defense
once wrote, "In the psychology of paralyzing fear, a small but
appreciable threat of massive destruction is a small but appreciable
threat of massive destruction. If our allies are worried that
there's a 5 percent chance of London or Paris going up in flames, it
won't help to say, 'Actually the threat is only 2 percent.' " Or 1
percent, or one-half of 1 percent.
Deterring nuclear buildups : Bush said yesterday that missile
defense can "strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for
proliferation." What an odd claim! China has already warned that it
would respond to missile defense by accelerating its nuclear missile
program—and, unlike Russia (which has made similar noises), China
has the money to do so. This would then give India an incentive to
accelerate its nuclear program, which would give Pakistan the same
incentive.
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wrcooper
- 04:33pm May 3, 2001 EST (#3172
of 3174) The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable
mystery. Doubt [and] uncertainty...appear the only result of our
most accurate scrutiny....But such is the frailty of human reason.
--David Hume
Even as it provokes weapons proliferation, missile defense will
distract us from the longstanding U.S. goal of negotiated
nonproliferation. Bush claimed yesterday that part of his "broad
strategy" would be "active nonproliferation." Yet the official Bush
administration policy is to refuse to discuss nonproliferation with
North Korea. After all, if we're going to be snuggled up under our
missile-defense blanket, why bother trying to lure North Korea into
the modern, civilized world? (And, if you're trying to build
political support for missile defense, why give North Korea a chance
to show that it's civilizable?)
Maybe the biggest problem with missile defense is that it will
distract us from what everyone agrees is a more serious threat than
ballistic missiles—nuclear or biological weapons smuggled into the
United States by boat, plane, or car. In fact, missile defense may
expand that threat. Let's suppose that, in the case of the "rogue
states," missile defense did have the "deterrent" effect that the
Bush administration claims, inducing them to shift resources away
from missile construction. What do you think they're going to do
with those freed-up resources—give money to the Red Cross? They're
going to focus on alternative ways to deliver weapons of mass
destruction to the United States. Last night on PBS's NewsHour With
Jim Lehrer, a missile-defense booster said that "a credible U.S.
commitment to missile defense" would "discourage countries from
building missiles." These countries, he predicted, would say to
themselves : "We're going to put millions of dollars into missiles
and the United States is just going to counter them. Let's do
something else." Yeah, and I think I know what the "something else"
is.
Alluding to the option of smuggling nukes into the United States,
someone once compared missile defense to locking just one of your
car doors to prevent theft. But, actually, that's too kind to the
logic of missile defense. If you don't lock a car door, it is as
likely a route of entry as the other door. With missile defense,
we're trying to lock a door that was never the preferred route of
entry to begin with. Saddam Hussein would rather smuggle a nuke in
anonymously than send one over on a missile, since the latter option
will get him killed and the former won't.
I live in the Washington, D.C., area, a few miles from ground
zero. So I'm all for spending money to reduce the chances that the
United States will be subject to nuclear attack. But missile defense
is just not the smart way to spend that money.
Robert Wright is the author of The Moral Animal and Nonzero : The
Logic of Human Destiny.
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