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Russian military leaders have expressed concern about US plans
for a national missile defense system. Will defense technology be
limited by possibilities for a strategic imbalance? Is this just SDI
all over again?
(785 previous messages)
rshowalter
- 11:03am Feb 26, 2001 EST (#786
of 790) Robert Showalter showalte@macc.wisc.edu
mister_shadow
2/26/01 3:54am your suggestion that we need to get solutions
that make sense, that fit basics, is surely right.
You're also certainly right when you say
If our goal is to reduce the threat of rogue
powers with nuclear missles, a ballistic missle defence is not the
effective way to do this.
Unless and until a ballistic missile defense is workable
this is obviously true. And if this ever occurs, it will take years.
And there are other, much cleaper, ways of keeping nuclear missiles
out of the hands of rogue (read small) nations. Conventional
military action can easily do this, with changes in international
rules much easier to get than a missile defense system.
But on your last answer, you are dangerously incomplete -
which means, in isolation, as you may have intended it, wrong:
Arms reduction and fostering high standards of
living and democracy in those rogue powers is the way to do this.
A part of the way --- but the ugliness of the world is quite
real, and nation states, including the US, have every right and
every obligation to ensure themselves an effective, flexible,
workable defense. We need a solution to our defense needs, and the
defense needs of the world, of disciplined beauty. rshowalter
2/9/01 1:53pm
rshowalter
- 05:11pm Feb 26, 2001 EST (#787
of 790) Robert Showalter showalte@macc.wisc.edu
It seems to me that human actions work best according to the
following pattern: rshowalt
9/25/00 7:36am
"Get scared .... take a good look ..... get organized .....
fix it .... recount so all concerned are "reading from the same page
...... go on to other things."
I think that's the pattern that works best for problem resolution
in individual minds, and I think this is the pattern that works best
when groups solve problems in satisfactory ways. I think this is the
pattern that characterizes most of the aesthetically pleasing and
practically efficient problem solving people do.
Our relationship to nuclear weapons has been nothing like this,
historically -- the problem solving has gone terribly and perversely
wrong.
People haven't known what to do. The situation is
conflicted and complicated. But some things seem especially clear.
There has been a lot of deception on all sides,
built into our military posturing.
Openness, by making first strikes more obviously
implausible, would make us all safer, and could do so without any
real sacrifice in deterrance.
If nuclear terror is to be made much less, or
ideally eliminated, effective ways of enforcing prohibition of
nuclear weapons are going to have to be found.
That would be distinctly easier if the United
States renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, and would be
progressively easier as the physical ability of the nuclear powers
to make a militarily useful first strikes got smaller and smaller.
rshowalter
- 08:07pm Feb 26, 2001 EST (#788
of 790) Robert Showalter showalte@macc.wisc.edu
In rshowalter
2/9/01 1:53pm Dawn and I defined beauty as it could be applied
to military circumstances.
Good military theory (and practice) is an attempt to produce
beauty in Heisenberg's sense ( proper conformity of the parts to one
another and to the whole ) in a SPECIFIC context of assumption and
data.
Everything has to fit together (and, I think, be clearly
describable in words, pictures, and quantitative descriptions,
linked together comfortably and workably, both as far as internal
consistency goes, and in terms of fit to what the military theory is
supposed to apply to in action.
Military theories that are useful work comfortably in people's
heads, so that they can guide real action..
Our nuclear postures and circumstances are as far from
beautiful as they could possibly be. One might call them
ugly. But they are a particular, special, kind of ugly.
There is no SPECIFIC context of assumption and data that
really works for our nuclear policy, or for our understanding of the
world that policy is built for.
I've been reading a lot of "defense theory" in journals like
"International Security" -- and after all these years, nobody seems
agreed on the most basic facts.
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