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Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a
nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a
"Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed
considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense
initiatives more successful? Can such an application of
science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable,
necessary or impossible?
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(5370 previous messages)
lchic
- 07:33am Oct 29, 2002 EST (#
5371 of 5379) ~~~~ It got understood and exposed
~~~~
Carbondioxide --- getting to truth
rshow55
- 11:24am Oct 29, 2002 EST (#
5372 of 5379)
Can we do a better job of finding truth? YES. Click
"rshow55" for some things Lchic and I have done and worked for
on this thread.
This is a hopeful time - but dangerous in spots - a good
time for people to be careful. A lot of things could
sort out well - if we're reasonably careful.
Wonder how people might make movies of some dramas going on
for real right now? Good, realistic ones, with happy endings?
People in the movie business, associated with the UN, could
make a real contribution here. They understand what complex
cooperation and negotiations take - and we're in circumstances
that could benefit from such negotiations.
An early warning post! manjumicha
10/16/02 10:56pm
mmuskin
- 02:40pm Oct 29, 2002 EST (#
5373 of 5379)
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Part 1 of 2)
October 29, 2002
Saudi Arabia Takes Steps To Acquire Nuclear Weapons
Exclusive. Highly-reliable sources indicate that the
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has, since the
beginning of October 2002, and possibly before, begun active
efforts to acquire completed nuclear weapons.
It is known that Saudi officials had approached officials
of the Government of Pakistan in this regard, on the basis
that Saudi possession of such weapons would act as a deterrent
to any possible Israeli threat of nuclear force against Saudi
Arabia. The sources indicated that Saudi Arabia was not
interested in acquiring nuclear weapons manufacturing
capability, or weapons-grade raw material, but only in
acquiring actual weapons, preferably for missile delivery
using Saudi CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)
which had been acquired from the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).
It is believed that the Saudi officials had also approached
one or more other states to assist in the provision of nuclear
weapons, possibly including the PRC and/or the Democratic
People’s Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK).
There is no indication that any of the states approached
have hinted that they would consider the Saudi requests,
although some of the negotiations have been ongoing, with
several meetings taking place.
However, GIS sources also indicated that the Saudi premise
in attempting to deter an Israeli nuclear threat was flawed,
based on the fact that Israeli officials fundamentally agree
that the continued stability of the House of Sa‘ud was the
most preferred Israeli option for Saudi Arabia, and that
Israel was anxious not to disturb the status quo in the
Kingdom. The collapse of Saudi Arabia and its possible
break-up and/or radicalization was an undesirable strategic
outcome for Israel, unless the Saudi Hejaz region could be
restored to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Hashemites —
who were kings of Iraq and still are the Royal line of Jordan
— were removed from their control of Mecca and Medina when the
Hejaz was seized by the House of Sa‘ud in the 1919-1925
timeframe.
However, Israeli sources have made it clear that a Saudi
acquisition of nuclear weapons, coupled with signs of either
direct Saudi hostility toward Israel or the prospect of a
collapse of the House of Sa‘ud in the Kingdom, would trigger
pre-emptive military action by Israel against Saudi missile
facilities.
[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, April 2, 2002:
Israel Makes a Point of Highlighting Saudi Strategic Missile
Facilities, quoted in full below]
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted in its April 2,
2002, report:
There was speculation in Jerusalem and, apparently, in
Middle Eastern capitals on April 1, 2002, over reports leaked
into the Israeli press on March 27, 2002, with extensive
details of the Saudi Arabian CSS-2 ballistic missile
facilities. Details of the facilities and the CSS-2 missiles —
supplied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1990 —
were already well-known within the intelligence and defense
communities of most interested countries. The question being
raised by the latest reports was why attention should be
focused at this time on the facilities.
The Israeli, Hebrew-language daily Yediot Aharonot reported
on March 27, 2002, that the complex was built in the
al-Sulayel desert about 500km south of Riyadh. The complex
contains huge missile silos, residential areas and factories
in King Khaled City. The newspaper published photographs from
the Space Imaging Corporation’s Ikonos satellite of what was
identified as two missile bases and a complex of 33 buildings,
eight of them capable of storing CSS-2 ballistic missiles,
which have a range of 2,500 to 3,500km, depending on payload.
GIS sources believe that it is almost certain that the Saudis
had — failing to obtain nuclear warheads — intended to deploy
the systems with chemical and/or biological warheads.
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