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Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

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wrcooper - 11:40am Oct 16, 2003 EST (# 15155 of 15166)

CONCLUDED

So far as I know of the flight tests, four out of seven have been considered completely successful. At least one other was considered a partial success. All those flights have been parts of the test program. Even when there's a failure, that doesn't mean that everyting failed

The only critical question is, "Is the system ready to deploy?" The answer hinges on its reliability in being able to discriminate real-world targets and kill them. The reason Clinton delayed making a decision to deploy the system was the persistence of deep reservations regarding its effectiveness if confronted with unknown countermeasures. No adequate answer to this problem was put forward at that time, nor has one in the time since then been suggested by the system’s military planners. Therefore, the most crucial criterion to be satisfied before making a decision to deploy has not been satisfied. It thus makes no sense to rush forward to deployment until this fundamental problem has been resolved, and the planned deployment makes no contribution toward finding a resolution.

What it seems that the administration is doing by "deploying" now is making sure that there isn't a "years long" vulnerablility gap between the time that the BMD components are considered "ready for prime time" and the the time that they can be effectively deployed….The time to close the barn door is before the horses get out.

This is not the way to keep this breed of horse under control. Other means will serve better and more reliably. The NMD program is flawed and unready.

Let's also don't forget that the other thing that a BMD can provide is defense against an accidental launch or hijacking of one of those hundreds or thousands of aging Russian and Chinese models.

Once again, the way to guard against this threat is not by way of an unreliable missile defense system, but by working closely with the Russians and Chinese to help keep their nuclear arsenals secure and safe. A missile defense system that is unreliable is worse than no system at all. The deployment of an ABM system is more likely to push China into expanding its missile arsenal, thus increasing the probability of an accidental launch, than of reducing the risk of such an event.

You hope. This administration and the previous one apparantly don't agree with that. Perhaps there's a desire to avoid putting too many eggs into one basket.

You hope, apparently, that our adversaries will accommodate the NMD planners by choosing to try to strike at us with an ICBM, a weapon that is expensive, technologically sophisticated, difficult to manufacture, and easily traceable and highly vulnerable to detection and interdiction. As I have said before, supposing that the US managed to deploy a fully reliable NMD system, our adversaries would then no doubt resort to using low-tech means of delivering bombs; they’d smuggle a small nuclear bomb into the country aboard, for instance, a container ship or a private aircraft. If I were the leader of a terrorist group or a rogue nation that wished to attack the US with WMD, an ICBM would be the last option I’d consider. If North Korea were so bold as to try to target the US with a nuclear-tipped ICBM, I have no doubt that, long before it was able to deploy such a weapon, the US would crush it.

rshow55 - 11:40am Oct 16, 2003 EST (# 15156 of 15166)
Can we do a better job of finding truth? YES. Click "rshow55" for some things Lchic and I have done and worked for on this thread.

Nothing the US has is even close to working in terms of reasonable tactical assumptions.

Can systems work in terms of test objectives?

For the test objectives used, sure.

Can the system work to do what it is supposed to do?

That's a much bigger question. With a much less optimistic answer.

gisterme - 11:46am Oct 16, 2003 EST (# 15157 of 15166)

"...Without a firm knowledge of exactly how any potential warhead is packaged, designed an interceptor that has a certainty of reaching and destroying its target is a pipe dream..."

Umm, what difference would "packaging" of a warhead make in a mach 30 head-on collision? Please clarify.

As for "certainty of reaching and destroying it's target", I'd say "probability" is a much better choice of words than "certainty". If you have an individual interceptor that has an 80% probability of destroying its target and the asset you're trying to protect is very valuable then you launch two interceptors. Not good enough odds yet? Then launch four or eight interceptors.

The odds are zero of intercepting an incoming ICBM warhead, regardless of how it's packaged, if there are no interceptors.

lchic - 11:46am Oct 16, 2003 EST (# 15158 of 15166)
TRUTH outs ultimately : TRUTH has to be morally forcing : build on TRUTH it's a strong foundation

NK is set to test a nuclear bomb!

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