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Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

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rshow55 - 08:43am Oct 9, 2003 EST (# 14716 of 14730)
Can we do a better job of finding truth? YES. Click "rshow55" for some things Lchic and I have done and worked for on this thread.

On this board, lchic and I have been advocating efforts to find shared space - - paths for communication - between adversaries, and enemies locked in impasses.

. A Communication Model http://www.worldtrans.org/TP/TP1/TP1-17.HTML

The diagram on shared space is very general - and the piece is short.

For entirely hard-headed and practical reasons, and other reasons, we need to be able to communicate as human beings.

The NYT is involved in such communication - sometimes including discussions between governments.

I'm honored that people at the NYT are occasionally willing to discuss things with me.

Here's a post on missile defense from a while back - that cites http://www.mrshowalter.net/pap2 on a link that no longer works - but worked for a long time. A link that I appreciated.

http://www.mrshowalter.net/a_md2000s/md2677.htm

Issues of missile defense are parts of a larger picture.

We're dealing with primal issues here. I believe that everybody who cares about the survival of the world should consider carefully the concerns about the military-industrial complex set out in the FAREWELL ADDRESS of President Dwight D. Eisenhower January 17, 1961. http://www.geocities.com/~newgeneration/ikefw.htm

The core things Eisenhower warned against have happened. In many ways it is humanly understandable -- but there is a mess, it is as dangerous as it can possibly be, and we need to fix it.

Friedman's piece is beautiful to me today. 13316-7 http://forums.nytimes.com/webin/WebX?8@13.flpObfe8M9p.1352042@.f28e622/15004

This thread is a "game" in the game theory sense. Some games are more serious than others.

It seems to me that some essential things are working.

fredmoore - 08:45am Oct 9, 2003 EST (# 14717 of 14730)

Will,

This from a discussion group:

http://www.yarchive.net/mil/icbm_decoy_rv.html

"First off, with good system design it should not be possible to use RF or IR discrimination in the exoatmospheric regime. The threat nation can tailor both the RV and the decoy to have an identical signature. Simply encasing the actual RV in an identical mylar balloon as used with the decoys would ensure that they are indistinguishable, and should subtle differences exist (possibly in IR signature due to small temperature differences), it would be useless for an ABM system since they differences would have to known in advance, and programmed into the system. Even if test flights are closely observed by the U.S., and it is possible to identify decoy vs RV signature discriminants, significantly different "wartime" signatures of the actual deployed systems would be make it most unlikely that clever discrimination algorithms - if any are developed - would actually work in practice. A systematic discrimination failure, like one that incorrectly classifies all RVs as decoys would render the whole system utterly useless. Second, with a higher weight penalty decoy effectiveness can be extended into the atmosphere, as the Chevaline does. Using a (mostly) empty heatshield, supplemented by a rocket to offset the effects of drag creates a convincing decoy that is effective well into the upper atmosphere. Fewer can be carried obviously, but several can be used for each RV replaced from the payload. Multiplying the number of interceptors the defender must deploy and fire by, say, three or four, nearly triples or quadruples the cost of the deployed system at minimal cost to the attacker. "

looks bad for the defender Will.

Plus this from:

http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1984&sequence=0&from=7

"If all went according to plan, at least two SBIRS-low satellites would focus on the approaching warhead and determine a more precise path for it. The earlier a precise determination of an incoming warhead's path is made, the sooner the first salvo of interceptors can be fired. SBIRS-low would also record valuable information about the amount of heat given off by the object, which could prove helpful in distinguishing a warhead from decoys. Although SBIRS-low is intended to continuously buttress the national missile defense system, it will also support theater missile defenses (systems designed to defend areas outside the United States from relatively short range missiles). Both the precise tracking of SBIRS-low and its ability to distinguish warheads from decoys should significantly aid theater missile defenses. Unlike NMD, however, those defenses are limited in both the area they protect and the length of time for which they are designed to be deployed.

The high-resolution X-band radar is a primary sensor for national missile defense. In response to cues from other sensors (such as satellites), it will search for incoming warheads, try to discriminate between real warheads and decoys, and supply high-quality tracking information to the interceptor. After an intercept attempt, X-band radars will determine whether the warhead was successfully destroyed (so-called kill assessment). "

This link is more positive but it is clear that decoys are cheap to deploy compared to the cost of interceptors.

Decoys are a difficult problem for the defender but nonetheless could swamp the financial capacity of the attacker as well.

The current NMD system is not looking good here.

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