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Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

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gisterme - 03:45pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11558 of 11565)

rshow55 2/14/02 6:49pm

Based on the Kennedy/Rumsfeld interview:

http://www.aip.org/enews/fyi/2001/009.html

You say Mr. Rumsfeld makes:

"...2. The assumption that we have a correct and complete understanding of deterrence and responses to threat fit to the situations we're thinking about...."

Robert,...must you always assume absolutes yourself? What you say about this assumption, and the previous one ("stick to it" is always the right answer) is revealing of a certain feature of your world view...extreme idealism.

Why is a "correct and complete" undersatnding of anything prerequisite to doing something...even if that something may lead to a more correct and complete understanding? How does one decide when perfection has been achieved in anything? Requireing perfect knowledge prior to moving forward in a matter is a prescription for gridlock. That's because you can't know that you know everything. Just because you don't have perfect knowledge doesn't mean you're half-cocked. We most often learn by doing. We know a lot; but it's insignificant when compared to all that there is to be known... all that is yet to be learned.

deter (from Miriam Webster)

1 : to turn aside, discourage, or prevent from acting by fear or consideration of dangerous, difficult, or unpleasant attendant circumstances or consequences

2 : INHIBIT *painting to deter rust* synonyms see DISSUADE

"Deterrence" is the act of deterring.

WRT "deterrence" as applied to NMD I'd have to say that not the same as "deterrence" in the context of MAD.

The "deterrence" context of MAD is "you can't nuke us without getting nuked yourself, no matter what". But that can only work if both parties care whether they are nuked or not. Symmetry of concern is required.

The "deterrence" context of NMD is "you can't nuke us with your missiles when you get them so why bother getting them? They won't work if you do." The principal consequence of this form of deterrence is the assurance that a missile attack will fail. The secondary consequences of that assured failure are unspecified. I prefer that to "required to nuke 'em".

That's an assymetric situation...the adversary need not care whether he gets nuked or not. Some evil dictator could turn out to be the ultimate suicide bomber. So, because he may not care about consequences, we must care enough to make sure any attack is unsuccessful.

Deterrence in the context of NMD is what Mr. Rumsfeld was talking about here. What he said was:

In this case, if I could just elaborate for a moment, the principle of deterrence, it seems to me, goes to what's in the minds of people who might do you harm and how can you affect their behavior.

The problem with ballistic missiles, with weapons of mass destruction, even though they may be a low probability, ... the reality is, they work without being fired. They alter behavior.

Those are insightful statements. The prospect of our adversaries having those missiles is altering our behavior to the extent that we feel the need to defend against them. That's what NMD is all about. If by our behavior we can deter the adversary from developing such missiles by rendering them ineffective in advance, great. But if the adversary persists, we'll need to be able to handle that situation as well. That's why NMD can't be a bluff this time. It has to work and I believe it will.

lchic - 04:51pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11559 of 11565)

scrap adj : disposed of as useless

rshow55 - 04:56pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11560 of 11565)

No, we can't afford to bluff. Especially a bluff that is terribly expensive, and so ineffective that it reduces our credibililty with both friends and enemies, and distorts our decision making so that solutions that would otherwise be perfectly feasible are ruled out.

rshow55 - 05:19pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11561 of 11565)

We need to do things that work - - find ways to win .

Why not victory ?

Our accounting, and muddles, are so great that there's a lot of room for improvement - so we can be more effective militarily, in the ways that matter for the national interest.

We need to win the war on terror -- and greatly reduce the risk from weapons of mass destruction - in the short term, and in the long term, too.

Is this so difficult, given the resources that we have?

It would take a realistic evaluation of what we can actually do, and the challenges we face.

And enough discipline so we don't squander our real chances.

rshow55 - 05:24pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11562 of 11565)

Any "solution" that we can't explain to the Europeans, the Russians, the Japanese, and the South Koreans (who all WANT to be on their side, if we give them a way) is no solution.

And any "solution" that we can't explain and justify, directly and effectively, to most people in the Islamic nations, after the necessary work, isn't a solution, either.

We want to rid the world of the risks from weapons of mass destruction in general, and specifically rid the world of the scourge of some radical islamic terrorists.

We should find ways of adressing those problems that can WORK - - and spend our resources on things that can make a difference.

rshow55 - 05:29pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11563 of 11565)

Our " missile defense" initiatives have been very powerful so far . . but they've worked against us.

They've gone a long way towards ripping NATO apart as an effective alliance, and reduced our credibility all over the world -- for little or nothing, but a big bill for some technical stunts.

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